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Abstract Jeannette Pols and Tamar Sharon kindly reviewed my case study of the art of
living with technology as an engagement with technomoral change. I am indebted to them
for their careful reading and critical suggestions to further elaborate the project. In my
response I focus on the question whose art we are talking about, while further elucidating
the reflexivity addressed in my essay. I conclude with some remarks on what we can learn
from micro studies like the one presented for macro level thinking on the ‘art of becoming’
with technology in a surveillance society.
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Pols strongly supports my focus on the aesthetic evaluation of the emerging network of
relationships in technologically mediated homecare. She is too modest as I am leaning on
her own work in this area, connecting it with earlier studies of professional artistry as
reflection-in-action and with recent work on processes of technomoral change. Pols
emphasizes that an aesthetic approach needs to consider all partners in the network, where
I have focused on caregivers as moral actors in their relationship with their clients. She
specifically suggests, partly referring to my own work (Kamphof 2013), to address the
form of the technology discussed, that forces caregivers to repair tensions in the rela-
tionship with their clients they haven’t asked for. Furthermore, Pols argues for technologies
that are aesthetically pleasing to their users and for more space for experiment in new
technologically mediated care practices. Responding to these recommendations, I will









clarify some points about the case discussed and subsequently address the more general
question at stake here: whose art of living—or lack of such an art—are we talking about?
Monitoring technologies allegedly enable frail elderly people to live in their own homes
longer by catching emerging health and safety problems at an early stage. In order to bring
about these potential benefits, homecare clients have to approve the installation of a system
that registers data about their daily patterns of living far beyond what caregivers used to
know about them. Not surprisingly, clients are ambiguous about this. On the one hand, as
Pols suggests, many fear being left without recourse to help in case of accidents. On the
other hand, many also resist being seen as the kind of person that needs continuous
observation. They fear unsolicited intrusions into their lives. Clearly, the network of care
under discussion does not only pose moral challenges to caregivers. Clients play an active
role in ‘the art of relating’ that is required to make the new set-up work. They must allow
the sensors to read their bodily behavior and have to develop trust in the system and in the
caregivers monitoring their data. My fieldwork showed that mutual joking about the new
technological possibilities often played a vital role in the relationship between clients and
formal and informal caregivers observing them. Some clients indeed responded to the
sensors and the imagined person behind them affectively, in one case by waving goodnight
to the sensors, telling them they could stop now for the night.
The technological partner in the network could use improvement. By capturing data
through small, easily forgotten motion sensors and transferring these data out of the home
to be interpreted elsewhere, the system confirms ageist stereotypes of elderly people as
incompetent. The message conveyed by the current form of the system to homecare clients
is that their data are not their own, but belong to others who use them for taking decisions
on care. These decisions may be oriented to the wellbeing of clients, but could also include
paternalistic forms of control. At present, caregivers have to resolve the tensions that the
system introduces into the relationship with their clients as a relationship of trust. They
have to open conversations with their client about observations, who may have forgotten
the system, and provide appropriate levels of transparency. With an adjusted design, the
system could actively invite such conversations, for instance by providing a platform in the
home where data are open to negotiation. Secondly, as Pols suggest, the sensors could be
designed in such a way that they support feelings of being watched over in benign ways.
However, all of this can only succeed when the healthcare system at large supports the
use of data primarily for the wellbeing of individual clients. In the case presented,
management offered caregivers the freedom to experiment and take their own decisions.
One can imagine alternative scenarios in which insurance companies and other commercial
partners gain access to data and use them in ways that challenge relationships of trust on
the work floor. In sum, securing trustworthy user practices requires the co-operation of
many partners. Next to caregivers, clients and technologies, it should include engineers and
designers developing technologies, and government agencies, insurance companies and
healthcare managers financing and organizing the context of use. Representatives of these
last groups would do well to safeguard space for experimentation. In their own way, they
too have to be actively open to tensions technologies provoke and to the emerging meaning
of technologies in practices of use, and respond to these with feeling and imagination.
Technological and human partners bring different capacities to the dance of ‘reflective
implementation’ that would ideally result from such an active openness. Technologies do
not feel their way about tautegorically the way humans do, nor do they act out of pro-
fessional and personal commitment to challenged and cherished values. However, as
indicated, they do embody values—fitting and unfitting ones. In their shape and materiality
they carry (im)possibilities that can destabilize tacit values and ways of working and
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suggest new ways of relating—in this case—to clients’ bodies. These processes go beyond
what their makers and managers anticipated. Technologies therefore actively participate in
the heuristic aspect of the reflective process. The art considered here does not take place in,
nor belongs to human brains only; it is performed in the conversation between human and
technological actors, within practices in which these are embedded. This point is relevant
too for issues raised by Sharon.
Sharon argues that instead of providing an alternative to the work of Swierstra and
Verbeek, my essay serves as a supplement that fits in with the actional and relational
approach already taken by these authors. I agree, but also think that the differences in
emphasis that I presented—nicely summarized by Sharon as ‘‘less logos, less autos, more
practice, more relationality’’—are crucial. As a lens through which to study emerging
networks of technologically mediated relationships, it uncovers ethical artistry that is
overlooked in a focus on conscious deliberation. It enlarges the field for the study of an art
of living with technologies. It also shows that the reciprocal nature of this art is better
conceived of as an ‘art of becoming with’, since technological partners may not ‘live’, but
their meaning and identity, too, emerges only in relationship to humans and other tech-
nologies. Taking a performative approach, I do not argue that caregivers are not reflective.
I have attempted to show instead that the mode of reflexivity they demonstrate is better
understood as reflection-in-action and by-action then as a process of stop-and-think, even
when and where caregivers discuss their actions. Reflexivity, in so far as the human
partners in the art of becoming with technologies are concerned, ranges on a scale between
an actional, sensual-emotional mode and a conscious, thinking mode. However, at both
ends of the scale, the main ingredients are similar: openness and experimental respon-
siveness to problems that challenge existing knowledge, values and procedures. At both
ends, reflexivity appears as a strong reciprocal engagement with the environment, rather
than as a distanced attitude. For humans, the reverse of reflexivity is not action, but routine,
firm knowledge, prejudice or opinion taken for knowledge, and indifference. Technologies
invite reflection even in their obtuseness. But they can seriously hinder successful
reflective conversation when their design is restrictive.
Developing a relational view of the art of becoming together of humans and tech-
nologies not only emphasizes the social, material relationships in which humans are
embedded; it specifically enables to include the role of practices in which humans and
technologies both are embedded. Such a perspective shows caregivers as committed to
trust and to respect for their clients’ dignity, and thus to having to solve the privacy issues
not simply as individuals choosing these values as part of their identity, but as profes-
sionals taking their work seriously and as persons oriented to good relationships. Within
care practices, as well as within other social relationships, values do not appear as personal
preferences, but as transcendent to the people for whom they matter.
Another example that demonstrates the importance of considering practices, for the case
at hand, is how developers of monitoring technologies did not start from scratch, choosing
unfitting forms out of ignorance or bad taste. They took current care practices as their point
of departure, such as the charts for registering Activities of Daily Living used to establish
the ability for self care of frail clients (Glascock and Kutzik 2006). Another inspiration was
traditional village life, in which people would keep track of the wellbeing of isolated
neighbours by checking whether the chimney smoked in the morning. However, in the
design process, registrations that used to be done on paper by caregivers in the presence of
clients or by neighbours scanning the valley with their own eyes are translated into
automated data collection—which may be well intended, but also causes relational trouble.
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In my essay I have also suggested that a relational perspective on the value of privacy is
fruitful for thinking about technomoral change in a surveillance society at large. Sharon
lucidly points out the possibility of testing solutions and rules of thumb developed in this
case in other cases. I think we can go further. It may be idealistic, as Sharon states, to
expect companies to relate to customers on the basis of care and trust. However, consumer
trust or distrust in businesses and their services does have economic impact. Also, the
emphasis caregivers place on ways of ignoring and considering data ties in with already
familiar ways of respecting privacy in civil relationships in public space. Goffman (1963)
referred to the importance of ‘‘civil inattention’’ (p. 85): one doesn’t stare at others, but
after acknowledging the other’s presence averts the gaze. In many current situations,
technologies take us up in networks that require us to think of privacy less as a possession
of individuals, and more as a quality in and of good relationships. As Boyd (2010)
empathically claims with respect to privacy on social media: ‘‘we need to let go of our
cultural fetishization with the individual as the unit of analysis’’ and develop ‘‘models that
position networks, groups, and communities at the center of our discussion’’ (n.p.). Such
positioning requires us to take another view of the self much more seriously, indeed one
that is also present in Verbeek’s work: a self that doesn’t appear as an individual, regaining
creative control over its personal style of life, but a permeable, responsive self. Becoming
and working with technological and human others, this self attends to these relationships in
artful and fitting ways, in order to live in them as well as possible, because she cares about
them. Instead of being her creation, these relationships appear as what matters to her.
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